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Abstract
Background: Five outbreaks of  ebola  occurred in Uganda between 2000-2012. The outbreaks were quickly contained in 
rural areas. However, the Gulu outbreak in 2000 was the largest and complex due to insurgency. It invaded Gulu municipality 
and the slum- like camps of  the internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Bundigugyo district outbreak followed but was 
detected late as a new virus. The subsequent outbreaks in the districts of  Luwero district (2011, 2012) and Kibaale (2012) 
were limited to rural areas.
Methods: Detailed records of  the outbreak presentation, cases, and outcomes were reviewed and analyzed. Each outbreak 
was described and the outcomes examined for the different scenarios. 
Results: Early detection and action provided the best outcomes and results. The ideal scenario occurred in the Luwero 
outbreak during which only a single case was observed.  Rural outbreaks were easier to contain. The community imposed 
quarantine prevented the spread of  ebola following introduction into Masindi district. The outbreak was confined to the 
extended family of  the index case and only one case developed in the general population. However, the outbreak invasion 
of  the town slum areas escalated the spread of  infection in Gulu municipality. Community mobilization and leadership was 
vital in supporting early case detection and isolations well as contact tracing and public education.  
Conclusion: Palliative care improved survival. Focusing on treatment and not just quarantine should be emphasized as it 
also enhanced public trust and health seeking behavior.   
Early detection and action provided the best scenario for outbreak containment. Community mobilization and leadership 





Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a highly fatal emerging 
infection. It is an acute infectious febrile illness with 
no known cure. In 1976, the first outbreak occurred 
near a river called Ebola, in the Democratic Republic of  
Congo. Eight major epidemics occurred1,2 in  DR Con-
go3-6 and Gabon7 and about 2000 cases were reported 
in the 25 outbreaks. Until 2013, the Uganda outbreak 
was the biggest and most complex. Some 425 cases and 
224 deaths  occurred1,8 including 31 health care workers. 
Five distinct species of  Ebola have been identified but 
only 3 have caused disease outbreaks in humans9,10. The 
virus is spread by direct contact with body fluids of  cas-
es (dead or alive). Contact with killed bats or non-hu-
man primates is also linked to transmission. The liver, 
spleen, thymus, and lymph nodes and macrophage rich 
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lymphoid tissue, are targets for the Filoviruses. Liver 
damage leads to decreased production of  clotting fac-
tors and impairment of  coagulation.  The adrenal gland 
maintains blood pressure homeostasis. Its damage leads 
to reduced production of  steroids, sodium loss and hy-
povolaemia11. In this paper we report our experience 
with the Uganda ebola epidemics and discuss them in 
the context of  the current ebola outbreak in West Af-
rica.
Methods:
During the Ebola outbreaks in Uganda we kept detailed 
records of  the cases, presentation outcome. Laboratory 
confirmation was in South Africa, USA and Uganda. 
The cause of  the Gulu epidemic of  2000 was con-
firmed by the South Africa Institute of  Virology. In 
the second ebola outbreak in Uganda which occurred 
in Bundibugyo district in 2007 laboratory confirmation 
was carried out by CDC Atlanta. The two Luwero out-
breaks in 201112 and 201213 together with the Kibaale 
outbreak of  2012 were all confirmed by the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute.
Results: 
Figure 1 Ebola affected districts, Uganda, 2000-2012
The ebola outbreak of  2000 occurred in Gulu district 
( Fig 1) in northern Uganda. Masindi and Mbarara 
districts were also affected with imported cases from 
Gulu. This was the first such outbreak in the country. 
Insecurity due to insurgency from LRA rebels made 
the rural villages inaccessible. Some 1.3 million inter-
nally displaced persons(IDPs) were leaving in slum like 
camps14,15. 
The camps were organised around trading centres or 
schools.  
Each camp had between 1000 and 10,000 inhabitants 
living in temporary huts with minimal sanitation and 
overcrowded. The camps were low grade towns and 
slums (Fig 2).  Infrastructure had collapsed including 
schools and roads. The health care delivery system had 
deteriorated severely. There was an acute shortage of  
staff  due to lack of  motivation to go to insurgency 
areas.  Traditional beliefs explained the deaths within 
the context of  witchcraft. The clustering of  deaths by 
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Fig 1 Map of Uganda showing ebola affected districts, 2000-2012
family lent support to this idea and fomented rumours, 
which the local media often capitalised on. 
The epidemic started in a rural village around August 
20001,8. A husband and wife died followed by mem-
bers of  the immediate households. It is after commu-
nity members started dying that medical assistance was 
sought. Six weeks later the first cases were admitted to 
Lacor hospital. Three student nurses died that week to 
be followed a few days later by more nurses and pa-
tients.  On the 14th October2000,  the Sudan Ebola 
virus was confirmed by the South Africa Institute of  
Virology as the cause of  the epidemic.  Health workers 
panicked and fled leaving patients, most of  who died in 
the first weeks of  the outbreak. Some IDP camp dwell-
ers commuted to Gulu town at night to avoid abduction 
by the rebels ( Fig 3) . They also feared ebola in rural ar-
eas. Unfortunately they brought ebola with them to the 
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Figure 2: Camps of 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDP), Gulu, Uganda,2000
Source : WHO Report, 2000 
Fig 3: Internally displaced persons (IDP), Gulu municipality, 2000
slum areas of  Gulu Municipality. The urban invasion of  
ebola led to even more panic and scare. Cases escalated 
in the municipality.
Four more ebola outbreaks in the districts of  Bundib-
ugyo[2] (2007), Luwero (2011), Kibaale (2012) and Lu-
wero in 2012 (Figure 1) have occurred. These outbreaks 
were basically rural and were ably contained. 
The national response
The national response was comprehensive and multi-
sectoral. His Excellency, the President mobilised the 
country for a national response. He directed all sectors 
to participate in the response. A national task force was 
appointed to coordinate the implementation of  the na-
tional strategy. Similar coordinating mechanisms were 
set up at the district, county, subcounty, parish and 
village levels. Within weeks cascade training amplified 
by training of  trainers had covered the country. Each 
village appointed leadership (Chairman and scout) to 
coordinate activities. The scout was the backborne of  
community based case search and isolation and public 
education. He was constantly on phone with the village 
team members and the district coordinating and sur-
veillance8. The entire response was coordinated by the 
district task force and surveillance centre (Figure 4).  
A special mobilisation team was required for the IDP 
camps, most of  who were at great risk in view of  the 
overcrowding and insanitary slum like environment. 
Camp leaders of  blocks of  100 families were recruit-
ed, trained to undertake active case search of  suspect-
ed cases. A village scout (secretary) supported the team 
with record keeping and liaison with the district task 
force and surveillance office. They were actually hired 
for the period the outbreak lasted.  Incentives were paid 
to those for each ebola case reported and revalidated. 
A truce was negotiated between the community and 
the rebel leaders to allow free access to their area of  
operation. All the stakeholders including the rebels, se-
curity personnel and task force members were part of  
the 160 committed individuals that patrolled the camps 
and organised containment activities including burials 
and the ambulance service8. Soft power and negotiation 
and understanding were tools used with community in-
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Fig. 4: Surveillance flow chart for community cases detection and isolation
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volvement. Isolation and palliative care was provided at 
Lacor and Gulu hospitals. Case fatality improved to less 
than half  towards the end of  the outbreak (Fig 5). 
A mobile team or a trained burial team would be des-
patched immediately on request.  The scout worked 
in liaison with the other levels and stakeholders. A 
single updated and jointly owned situation report was 
announced in the evening of  each day. This ensured 
transparency and ably managed rumours. This outbreak 
which stared in a rural area invaded Gulu municipality 
slums with devastating consequences.  Some 393 cases 
in Gulu district alone occurred. The most affected areas 
were in the municipality (Table 1 ).The attack rates for 
the municipality from slum areas was the highest (15 









Fig: Case Fatility Rate of confirmed Ebola Cases by Week, Gulu district, Uganda 18th Sept to 18th Dec 
2000 Fig. 5 Cases fatality rate of confirmed cases by week, 18th September- 18th December 2000, Gulu
Parish Sub county County No. of cases* 
Kasubi Bardege Gulu Municipality 40 
Kirombe Layibi Gulu Municipality 36 
Atibaar Bungatira Aswa 31 
Bardege Bardege Municipality 19 
Kanyonga Bardege Municipality 18 
Techo Layibi Municipality 17 
Ariaga Laroo Municipality 17 
Pageya Koro Omoro 16 
Patudat Layibi Municipality 15 
Vanguara Pece Municipality 13 
Pabbo Kal Pabbo Kilak 13 
 
Table 1: Cumulative ebola cases by most affected parish, Gulu municipality, Uganda, 2000
fold) compared with other rural counties ( Table 2). It 
took 6 months to contain the outbreak which had in-
vaded the municipality through slums.
Examples of  successful mobilisation:  the critical 
role of  the community
Community mobilisation was a central strategy of  the 
national response. The community undertook early de-
tection and swift reporting of  suspected cases, enforced 
isolation at household level and maintained working re-
lationship with the rebels.  The community included the 
rebels and other stakeholders including opinion leaders 
and traditional healers. 
The vital role of  the community was demonstrated 
when a case escaped from Gulu hospital to her ances-
tral home in Masindi district. She belonged to an ex-
tended family of  73 members in the district.  The local 
community imposed quarantine of  these members and 
successfully prevented transmission beyond the extend-
ed family. Some 25 out of  27 total cases in the district 
were only among the extended family members. In con-
trast, only one case occurred in the general Masindi dis-
trict population of  314,00016. 
The second ebola outbreak in Uganda occurred in Bun-
dibugyo district in 2007. Although we were prepared 
this was another different experience. This was a new 
virus which was isolated 6 months after onset. The iso-
lation was carried out at the CDC, Atlanta. However 
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Omoro* 111,886        19 1.6 1.0 
Aswa 88,450 9 1.0 0.6 
Mwoya 45,350 10 2.2 1.4 
Gulu Municipality 45,768 109 23.8 14.9 
Kilak 105, 995 32 3.0 1.9 
 
Table 2: Ebola Attack rates per 10,000 population by county, Gulu district , Uganda, 2000
once the diagnosis was confirmed it took just 3 weeks 
to contain the outbreak. Community mobilisation and 
involvement contained the outbreak. Altogether 116 
cases and 39 deaths were confirmed, including 14 health 
care workers. Unlike in the Gulu outbreak, the health 
care workers contracted infection before the isolation 
units were established.
Early detection was vital in limiting the Luwero 2011 
outbreak to a single case12. This was the third outbreak 
since 2000.  On the 5th of  May, a 13 year old girl was 
admitted to Bombo hospital with a 5 day history of  
fever, diarrhoea and vomiting. She was isolated and a 
blood sample taken. She developed vaginal bleeding 
and deteriorated and died the following day. The labora-
tory results from the Uganda Virus Research Institute, 
Entebbe confirmed the Sudan Ebola subtype12. The 
results were communicated quickly to the community 
on the media and on mobile phones. The outbreak was 
promptly contained with just a single fatality. Twenty 
four contacts were followed up with community sup-
port. This should be the ideal scenario for Ebola con-
tainment. This was a typically a rural ebola outbreak. 
The fourth Ebola outbreak17 occurred in the district of  
Kibaale. On the 12th July 2012, a 16 year old female 
from Kikaara village 55 km west of  Kagadi. She was 
opening up forest land with her husband when she fell 
sick. She was admitted to Hapuyo Health Centre III 
with complaints of  fever, diarrhoea and vomiting, and a 
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*Population data at sub county unknown to compute attack rates
*  Reference county 
nose bleed just before she died. Nine relatives who par-
ticipated at the funeral died including a mother, sisters 
and a priest. One health care worker also died. This was 
typically a rural outbreak during which the community 
supported the follow up of  408 contacts. Some 24 cases 
and 16 deaths occurred. The outbreak was contained in 
six weeks.
Six months later another Ebola outbreak erupted in Lu-
wero district and was confirmed early by the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute. This time the index case was 
a 30 year old motorcycle taxi rider. He was admitted to 
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Nyimbwa Health centre IV on the 20th October 2012, 
with complaints of  fever and difficulty in breathing. He 
died 3 days later and was buried the following day by 
relatives from as far as 70 miles away in Jinja.  Contact 
tracing by the community and members of  the district 
task forces was carried on all who participated at the fu-
neral. A wife, mother and a sister all died within 2 weeks. 
The brother of  the index case had escaped to Mulago 
the national hospital, but was quickly isolated. The Jin-
ja contact too developed fever, but was identified early 
and isolated. Some 119 contacts were followed without 
incident. The epidemic was contained in 6 weeks.
Table 3: Propotion of screened suspected cases revalidated as true cases by the supervisors, Uganda












95% CI  
Gulu 1069* 536 533* 50.1% 47.1 – 53.2 
Bundibugyo 192 116 76 60.4% 53.1 – 67.3 
Luwero  5 1 4 20.0% -*** 
 
Table 4: Laboratory results of suspected ebola cases, Bundibugyo, 2007, Uganda
Laboratory status Number  Proportion %  
   
 Laboratory positive 42 21.9 
Laboratory negative 76 39.5 
Laboratory negative but probable 74 38.5 
Total tested  192 100 
 





In this paper we describe our experience with several 
ebola outbreaks in Uganda.
Lessons to learn from these scenarios are that it was 
easier to stop the rural based epidemics. However in 
the case of  Gulu the outbreak had become urbanised 
lise, the urban slum dwellers are individualistic, luck so-
cial support,  and are money dependant and difficult 
to mobilise in their overcrowded neighbourhoods.  For 
instance community mobilisation was quick in Masindi 
in response to an ebola patient who had escaped to the 
district from Gulu. The community imposed isolation 
of  all 73 members of  the index extended family. Of  the 
27 infections in the district 25 were from the extended 
family. Only one case came from the general population 
16.
Role of  early detection and action 
Delays in early detection prolonged the spread of  in-
fection and late action in the districts of  Gulu district 
(6 weeks); Bundibugyo (6 months); Kibaale (6 weeks). 
Most (75%) of  the delays were at community level. 
Once the diagnosis was made, it took on average 5- 17 
days to contain the outbreak, except for the Gulu out-
break.  It took 66 days post confirmation to register 
the last case in Gulu. The Luwero outbreak of  2011 
was contained during the first week. The critical role 
of   early diagnosis and action was vital in containment.
Challenges in early diagnosis and detection
Besides the slum environment there were some techni-
Table 5: Timeline and level of  delays in outbreak confirmation of  cases, Uganda, 2000- 2012
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District Gulu, 2000 Bundibugyo, 2007 Luwero, 2011 












Onset of strange disease  
in community  
19/09/200
0 
0 02/08/2007 0 01/05/201
1 
0 









24 29/09/2007 59 06/05/201
1 
6 
Blood confirmation Ebola 14/10/200
0 
26 28/11/2007 117 09/05/201
1 
9 
Declaration national action 15/10/200
0 
27 29/11/2007 118 09/05/201
1 
9 
Last Case  14/01/200
1 
117 08/01/2008 159 06/05/201
1 
0 
Total days epidemic 
lasted** 
 117  159  6 
       
From laboratory 
confirmation 
 to last case   
 91  42  -6 
 
          318 319
** Timelines approximate 
in the camps and also in town slums. As a result, attack 
rates increased steeply in town suburbs of  Gulu (Ta-
ble1, 2).  These outcomes depend on the greater mobil-
ity of  the people and the differences between rural and 
urban. While the rural people have a communal spirit, 
social networks,  are self-reliant and are easy to mobi-
cal challenges which affected timely detection and iso-
lation of  cases. Some of  these challenges are associated 
with some weaknesses in the application of  the clinical 
syndromic based diagnosis. The clustering of  deaths and 
bleeding manifestations and the death of  health care 
workers is suspicious.  However, there are many condi-
tions that mimic Ebola in Uganda and include illnesses 
like malaria and other enteric and parasitic fevers. Some 
atypical cases presented without fever or bleeding.   Fe-
ver was absent in 15% of  cases while bleeding tenden-
cies were observed only in 30-53% of  admissions in 
Gulu18 . Bleeding manifestation was also  rare in the 
West Africa outbreak19.  About half  of  the suspected 
cases identified by the community surveillance were re-
validated as true cases. Only half  of  the suspected and 
probable Ebola cases tested yielded positive laboratory 
results20 (Table 3). This low positive predictive value for 
the case definition and the laboratory tests is a major 
weakness affecting early diagnosis critical in initiating 
the national response.This is frustrating to the patients 
and the community. Laboratory tests and results helped 
in the confirmation of  cases and the management of  
admission to isolation units and also the management 
of  discharges. The sensitivity and the specificity of  the 
tests are not known and need local revalidation. 
 *Those with all data and infomation  available. 
*** numbers few.
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Isolation and case management
Isolation and care plays a critical part in outbreak man-
agement. We demonstrated in the Gulu outbreak that 
isolation and care actually reduced mortality18 . When 
the health care workers become more confident and 
motivated performance and patient survival improved. 
There was reduction in case fatality from 100% at the 
beginning of  the outbreak to less than 50% as quality 
treatment was instituted over time ( Fig 5) . Hence care 
and survival and not just quarantine be emphasized.
 
Inadequate human resource was a major challenge in 
the operations of  the isolation wards. Isolation wards 
are labour intensive; they need adequate, motivated and 
well rewarded workers. 
            
Similarities with the West Africa outbreak
The ebola outbreak in West Africa is very similar to the 
outbreak in Gulu. Both occurred in slum conditions 
in low resource countries. The Gulu outbreak started 
in a remote rural village near Southern Sudan, and en-
tered the slums of  Gulu municipality.  It also entered 
the overcrowded slum like internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camps. In Gulu confirmation was done 3 weeks 
after onset.  In West Africa the outbreak started at a 
remote common border of  three countries but took 
nearly 6 months to confirm19,21. Guinea, Sierra Leone 
and Liberia were severely affected. The clinical and 
technical challenges were similar to the Gulu experi-
ence. There was also a problem with laboratory out-
comes.  Only half  of  the suspected and probable cases 
yielded positive laboratory results18-21. At its peak, some 
150 new cases were reported daily22. By February 2015 
some 22,000 cases with 8800 cases had been report-
ed and 10% were health care personnel23. This unex-
pected burden of  disease and death overwhelmed the 
health care system. Gaps in isolation procedures were 
reported in both outbreaks18,19.In Gulu there was failure 
to implement barrier nursing as 64% of  the 31 health 
care workers got infected after the establishment of  
the isolation units. In Gulu several of  these infections 
occurred inadvertently in general wards. Some also oc-
curred among support staff  including ambulance driv-
ers.  It is reported also that 19 out 25 staff  working in 
the Ebola isolation ward in Kenema hospital in Sierra 
Leone also contracted the infection19. An assessment 
of  the causes of  this breach in barrier nursing needs 
further investigation. 
Conclusion 
The experiences of  Uganda are relevant but should be 
put in their true perspective. 
Africa potentially remains the epicenter of  the burden 
created by Ebola virus disease (EVD). Practical steps 
must be taken at country level particularly in critical ar-
eas. 
First there is a need to strengthen leadership at commu-
nity level for  contact tracing and the early identification 
and isolation of  cases. This was the backbone of  the 
management of  infection in the affected areas in the 
Uganda context. This was applied in the rural and later 
in the slum settlements in the Gulu municipality. Sec-
ond, the need to strengthen laboratory capacity for early 
detection of  the infection is critical. Third, focusing on 
supportive treatment and survival not just quarantine as 
such intervention reduced case mortality, isolated cases 
and increased public trust. Fourth, the need to eliminate 
the gaps in barrier nursing by institutionalizing infec-
tion control policy and plans in health facilities for ALL 
health workers and ALL their working environments. 
Fifth, the need to develop a human resource policy and 
plan that attracts rewards and retains workers. In or-
der to  support these critical areas there is a need to 
strengthen health care systems so that they can readily 
respond to the demands of  future outbreaks.
There is need to strengthen international collaboration 
and partnerships to support the building of  compre-
hensive health systems for surveillance and care.  Re-
gional teams and Centers of  Excellence will need to be 
developed to support rapid response and provide timely 
emergency stocks, expertise and technical support. The 
experience in West Africa demonstrates that the out-
break if  note detected early can paralyze socioeconomic 
activities and impact on development and security. The 
best hope for low resource countries at least for now is 
early detection and action. 
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